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CASE COMMENT
PAYING FOR SEX-WHEN IS A SCHOOL DISTRICT
LIABLE FOR TEACHER-STUDENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX?
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998)
Andrew Speranzini*
Gebser, a high school student, had a sexual relationship with a teacher
employed by Respondent Lago Vista Independent School District.' Gebser
did not report the relationship to school officials.2 The sexual relationship
continued for approximately one year until a police officer discovered the
teacher and Gebser having sex and arrested the teacher.' Respondent
immediately fired the teacher.4
Petitioners, Gebser and her mother, filed suit against the teacher and
against the school district seeking, among other things, monetary damages
for the violation of Title IX.5 Title IX provides that "[n]o person... shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving [fiederal financial assistance."6 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment
in favor of the respondent.7 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and HELD, a school
district cannot be held liable for damages under Title IX unless an official

* This Case Comment is dedicated to my inspiration and the one true constant in my life,
my daughter Brielle.
1. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (1998).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.

6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
7. See Gebser, 118 S. CL at 1993. The case was filed in state court and then removed to

federal court. The state law claims against the teacher were remanded to state court and are not
relevant to the discussion at hand. See id
8. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223,1224 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth

Circuit noted that it had recently rejected strict liability in teacher-student sexual harassment cases.
See id. at 1225. The court then rejected a vicarious liability standard. See id at 1226. The court

reasoned that such a standard would lead to liability in virtually every teacher-student sexual
The court did not consider a constructive notice standard because Doe did
harassment case. See id.

not pursue such a theory. See idat 1225.
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who has authority to address the discrimination and institute corrective
measures has actual knowledge and fails to take appropriate action.9
In Franklinv. Gwinnett County Public Schools,0 the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether monetary damages were available in an
implied right of action under Title IX' Petitioner Franklin, a high school
student, was repeatedly harassed by a teacher employed by the Gwinnett
County School District."2 Franklin alleged that the school district was
aware of the harassment, did nothing to stop it, and discouraged her from
pressing charges. 3
The school district argued that damages should not be available
because, among other reasons, Title IX was enacted under Congress's
spending clause power. 4 The school district contended that monetary
damages have traditionally not been available under spending clause

statutes for unintentional discrimination and that this limitation of

available remedies should likewise extend to intentional violations.1 5 The
Franklin Court rejected this argument, explaining that the reasoning for
disallowing monetary damages for unintentional violations does not exist

9. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
10. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
11. See id. at 62-63. The Court had previously held that Title IX contains an implied private
right of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
12. See Franklin,503 U.S. at 63. In addition, the teacher coerced Franklin into having sex.
See id.
13. See id. at 63-64.
14. See id. at 74.
15. See id. The Supreme Court previously concluded that compensatory relief is not available
as a private remedy for unintentional past violations of spending clause statutes. See Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 602-03 (1983). In Guardians,the
Supreme Court was considering a class action by minority members of a city police department for
compensatory relief under Title VI. See id. at 585. Title VI forbids recipients of federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of race in the administration of their programs or activities. See id. at
584 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994)). The minority police officers alleged that written
exams administered by the police department to make entry-level appointments were racially
discriminatory. See id. at 585. Title VI was passed pursuant to Congress's spending clause power.
See id. at 598. The Supreme Court reasoned that spending clause statutes involved something akin
to a contractual relationship between the government and the recipient of federal funds. See id. at
596. The recipient weighs the benefits and burdens of accepting federal money. See id. The Court
noted that in a typical case, the federal government ensures that the recipient satisfies the conditions
of the grant and the recipient knows what its obligations will be. See id. The Supreme Court then
reasoned that when a recipient intentionally discriminates, there is no question of what the
recipient's obligations were and that it was aware of those obligations. See id. at 597. However,
when the discrimination is unintentional, it is not clear what the recipient's obligations were and
definitely not obvious that the recipient was aware that it was violating the statute. See id. at 598.
In cases of unintentional discrimination, therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that monetary
relief should not be available. See id.
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when there is intentional discrimination.16 The Court then concluded that
monetary damages are available for actions brought to enforce Title IX
when there has been an intentional violation.17
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District,"' a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, involved a student's sustained sexual relationship
with a school's karate instructor.1 9 The girl's mother sued the school
district for violating Title IX.0 The Fifth Circuit held that a school district
could only be liable for teacher-student sexual harassment if the district
knew about, and was indifferent to, the harassment.21
The Fifth Circuit's holding hinged on two essential factors. First, the

16. See Franklin,503 U.S. at 74. The Court explained that a recipient of federal funds, in a
caseinvolving unintentional discrimination, lacks notice that it will be liable for monetary damages.
See id. However, there is no notice problem when intentional discrimination is alleged. See id. at
75.
17. See id. at 76. The FranklinCourt relied on the presumption previously established that
when a statute provides a right to sue for a violation of one's rights, a federal court may use any
available remedy to right the wrong. See id.at 66. However, Justice Scalia, in his concurring
opinion, reasoned that when a court judicially implies a private right of action, the court could also
imply categorical limitations on the scope of the remedies available under that action. See id. at 77
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia went on to write that "[t]o require, with respect to a right that
is not consciously and intentionally created, that any limitation of remedies must be express, is to
provide, in effect, that the most questionable of private rights will also be the most expansively
remediable." Ld.at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring). This language from Justice Scalia, in which two other
justices joined, sheds light on the proposition that the Franklin Court did not intend to create
expansive school district liability under Title IX, a proposition that was important to the ultimate
holding in Gebser.
18. 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
19. See id.
at 650. There was conflicting evidence concerning how much information school
officials had regarding an inappropriate relationship between the instructor and the student. See id.
at 65 1. A social worker employed by the district might have seen the instructor kiss the student in
the school parking lot. See id.at 650. The student alleged she told the school counselor about the
relationship, which the counselor denied. See id. at 651. There was also a meeting amongst the
school counselor, principal, student and the student's mother in which the mother expressed
concerns about inappropriate conduct by the teacher toward the student. See id.
20. See id. at 651. She also brought an action against the school district under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 as well as TitleIX and 1983 claims against the karate instructor. See id. All claims, except the
Title IX action against the school district, were dismissed by the trial court and were not under
review by the Fifth District. See id. The school district argued that it could not be liable under Title
IX unless it engaged in intentional discrimination. See id. at 652. The trial court instructed the jury
that the school district could be liable under a negligence theory. See id. The instruction was: 'Title
IX places on San Elizario Independent School District a duty not to act negligently toward its
students. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that San Elizario Independent School
District acted negligently in failing to take prompt, effective, remedial action with respect to what
it knew or should have known, then it violated Title IX." Id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with this
instruction. See id. at 660.
21. See id. at 660. For liability to attach to the school district, the court required that a school
official, who had supervisory power over the offending teacher and the authority to end the abuse,
had to have actual knowledge and fail to respond appropriately. See idL
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court reasoned that Title IX, as a spending clause statute, should not
generate liability on the part of the school district unless the district, as a
recipient of federal funds, agreed to assume the liability.22 The school
district could
not have agreed to assume liability unless it knew of the
violation.' 3
The Fifth Circuit also rested its holding and its rejection of agency
principles on the fact that, while Title VII refers to the agents of employers,
Title IX makes no such reference.24 Rather, Title IX imposes liability based
only on the acts of the recipients of federal funds.2
Soon after Rosa, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also considered
the standard of liability for school districts under Title IX in Smith v.
MetropolitanSchool DistrictPerryTownship.2 6 Appellant, a high school
teacher and swim coach, had sexual intercourse with appellee Smith, his
student assistant and a senior at the school. 27 Smith told no one about the
sexual relationship until after it was over, and no one ever witnessed the
two engaging in intercourse.2" Largely agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Rosa,29 the Seventh Circuit held that a school district is liable
under Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment only if an official of
the school district who had supervisory authority over the teacher and the
power to take action actually knew of the harassment and failed to
respond.2°
The court reasoned that agency principles should not be read into Title
IX for three reasons. First, the court explained that other decisions that
22. See ad at 654.
23. See id The Court reasoned that the school district, when it accepted federal funds, agreed
not to discriminate on the basis of sex but thought it unlikely that the district agreed to be liable
whenever its teachers discriminate on the basis of sex. See id The court, therefore, rejected liability
based on agency principles because this would create liability for school districts anytime a teacher
sexually harassed or abused a student. See id. at 655.

24. See id. at 654.
25. See id.
26. 128 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1997).
27. See id. at 1017. The student's parents, John and Sharon Smith, were also appellees. See
id. at 1014. In the text, the student is referred to as "Smith." Smith did not resist the teacher's
advances. See id. at 1017. The two had intercourse approximately twice a week during Smith's
senior year, almost always on school property. See id.

28. See id at 1017. The summer after Smith graduated, she told her parents about the
relationship and together they reported it to the police and school officials. The school suspended
the teacher two days later, demanding his resignation. The school then recommended to the State
Board of Education that the appellant's teaching license be revoked. Two years later Smith and her
parents filed suit against the school district alleging sexual discrimination under Title IX. The
school district moved for summary judgment, which was denied by the district court. The school

district then requested, and received, an interlocutory appeal on the issue of school district liability
under Title IX. See id. at 1017-18.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
30. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Rosa, 106 F.3d at 660).
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extended agency principles to Title IX misconstrued the Supreme Court's
quote of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson in Franklin." Meritorapplied
agency principles to Title VII.32 The FranklinCourt's reference to Meritor
was the principle support relied upon by various circuit courts when
holding that Title VII agency principles applied should also apply in
actions brought under Title IX.33 In Smith, the Seventh Circuit noted that
Franklindid not even consider the standard for school district liability
under Title IX, much less apply agency principles to Title IX.' Second, the
court explained that, unlike Title VII, Title IX made no reference to agency
principles.35 Whereas Title VII defines "employer" to include any agents
of the employer, Title IX defines "program or activity" to mean the
operations of a school system and to include only those who have
administrative control of the school.36 Third, the constitutional source of
the statutes is different.37 Whereas Title VII was passed pursuant to
Congress's commerce clause power, Title IX was enacted pursuant to the
spending clause power.3" Spending clause statutes allow monetary damages
only for intentional discrimination.39
In the instant case, the Supreme Court considered, for the first time, the
standard for school district liability under Title IX.' The Court held that
a school district is not liable under Title IX for teacher-student sexual
harassment unless a school official who has authority to institute corrective
measures has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the
3 1. See id. at 1022. The FranklinCourt had reasoned "[u]nquestionably, Title IX placed on
the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
"discriminates" on the basis of sex.' Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). We
believe the same rule should apply when ateachersexually harasses and abuses a student." Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992).
32. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
33. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Claiborne
County Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman v. OmahaPub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d
463,469 (8th Cir. 1996).
34. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1022. The Seventh Circuit explained that, although the Franklin
Court referred to the Title VII decision in Meritorto conclude that sexual harassment is intentional
discrimination, the Franklin Court never referred to Meritor's or any other Title VII case's
discussion on the standard for institutional liability. See id. The Seventh Circuit further noted that
the standard for school district liability based on a teacher's actions was not an issue before the
FranklinCourt because liability resulted from the district's intentional discrimination. See id
35. See id. at 1023 (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993)).
36. See id. at 1023-24.
37. See id. at 1028.
38. See id.
39. See id. Adopting agency principles for Title IX would allow for liability based on
negligence and, in some cases, would lead to strict liability. The court reasoned that this could not
be tolerated since it would be inconsistent with spending clause jurisprudence. See id. at 1028-29.
40. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1998).
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teacher's misconduct.4 '
The Gebser Court noted that petitioners sought to rely on Franklin's
reference to Meritor to support their argument that Title VII agency
principles should define the standard of school district liability under Title
IX.42 Specifically, petitioners argued that Franklin's comparison of
teacher-student sexual harassment with Meritor's supervisor-employee
harassment dictated that agency principles applied in Meritor to define
institutional liability under Title VII should also apply in a Title IX
action.43 However, the GebserCourt clarified that Franklin'sreference to
Meritorwas made only to put forth the general idea that sexual harassment
constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX.' The Court also briefly
noted that Title IX made no mention of an educational institution's
agents.45 Therefore, the Court reasoned that Title IX does not call for the
application of agency principles.46
The Court next considered legislative history and concluded that
applying agency principles would frustrate the purposes of Title IX.4' The
Court began with the general proposition that Congress did not intend for
a recipient of federal funding to be subject to unlimited liability where the
recipient was unaware of sex discrimination." The Court explained that
Title IX conditioned the awarding of federal funds on the recipient's
promise not to discriminate, essentially creating a contractual relationship
between the government and the recipient of federal funds.49 The Court
reasoned that Congress clearly did not intend that a school district be held
liable for unintentional sex discrimination since this would expose the
district to liability when it was not aware that it was violating the
contract.5 °
In addition, the Court looked to the express means of enforcement
included in Title IX as a reason for its holding." Title IX authorizes
agencies that disburse federal funding to suspend or terminate that funding
if the recipient discriminates on the basis of sex.52 However, an agency
cannot take action until it has notified the district of its violation and

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 1993.
See id. at 1995; see also supra note 31.
See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995.
See id
See id. at 1996.
See id
See id. at 1997.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1998.
See id.
See id.
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afforded it a chance to come into compliance.5 3 Therefore, the Court
concluded that it would be unwise to assume Congress intended an implied
enforcement scheme that permits substantial liability without regard to a
school district's notice of a violation when the express means of
enforcement requires such notice.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Gebser serves to clarify confusion
among the circuit courts on the standard of school district liability under
Title IX.' While more circuit courts had concluded that agency principles
do apply to Title IX, the Supreme Court's reasoning, and that found in
Rosa and Smith, is more extensive and more sound. 6 Most of the courts
that had concluded that agency principles should govern the standard of
liability under Title IX had relied almost exclusively on the Supreme
Court's quotation of Meritorin its Franklindecision and the subsequent
assumption that the Supreme Court thereby meant to extend Title VII
agency principles to Title IX. Without this assumption, the support for
finding agency principles relevant to Title IX becomes very weak.58
Gebser, Smith, and Rosa, in contrast to the cases applying agency
principles to Title IX, contained much more detailed analysis. All three

53. See id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994)). The Court reasoned that a primary purpose
for requiring notice and an opportunity to comply was to avoid diverting funding from public
education where a school district is unaware of its violation and is willing to take corrective action.
The Court explained that allowing damages to attach along agency principles would be in conflict
with this purpose. See it. at 1999.
54. See id.
55. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1026 n.11 (1996)
(noting that courts which have considered the issue of a school district's liability under Title IX for
teacher-student sexual harassment are hopelessly at odds); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94
F.3d 463,468 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that courts which have considered theissue of school district
liability under Title IX have failed to reach a consensus).
56. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1024 n.8 (noting that although four circuits have applied agency
principles to Title IX, the reasoning of these circuits is limited and conclusory).
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 31. Another primary argument relied on by courts applying agency
principles to Title IX is the policy guidance issued by the Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) on March 13, 1997. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1033. The OCR policy guidance stated
that agency principles govern school district liability under Title IX. The Seventh Circuit in Smith
considered the role of the OCR's policy guidance in the court's decision regarding the standard of
liability under Title IX. The court reasoned that the policy guidance failed to consider the spending
clause source of Title IX or the differences between Title IX and Title VII. In addition, the OCR
failed to consider the financial impact its policy guidance would have on school districts. The
Seventh Circuit, therefore, concluded that the policy guidance was poorly reasoned, providing no
rationale for applying agency principles to Title IX. The court then explained that the OCR policy
guidance was neither a regulation nor an interpretation of regulations passed by the Department of
Education or OCR. Therefore, for the above reasons, the Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that
it could not defer to the OCR's policy guidance. See id.
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focused on the differences in the language of Title IX and Title VII.59 The
fact that Congress made no reference to the agents of a school district in its
definition of a program or activity under Title IX was considered highly
indicative that Congress did not intend to hold a school district liable for
the actions of its agents absent actual knowledge. 60 The circuit courts
applying agency principles to Title IX did not satisfactorily address this
distinction.61
In addition, the fact that Title IX was passed pursuant to Congress's
spending clause power supports the position that an actual notice standard
applies to Title IX.62 The Supreme Court has always required that
institutions intentionally discriminate before those institutions will be held
liable under a spending clause statute forbidding discrimination. 63 This has
always been the standard under Title VI, another spending clause statute.'
There is no reason why the standard of liability for a school district under
Title IX should be any different. 65 Moreover, the Gebser Court reasoned
that the express means of enforcing Title IX required actual notice, and that
implying a much more expansive liability for an implied private cause of
action, in the absence of clear congressional intent, would be unwise.6
There also are sound policy reasons for requiring an actual notice and
deliberate indifference standard for school district liability under Title IX.
Because agency principles would make a school district liable in virtually
every instance in which a teacher sexually abuses or harasses a student,67
some school districts might choose to refuse federal funding rather than
risk such expansive liability.6" As the Seventh Circuit explained, Congress
did not intend to burden school districts with potentially unlimited liability
just because the district accepted federal funding.69 If agency principles
were applied to Title IX, a school district could never know with any

59. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996; Smith, 128 F.3d at 1023-27; Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997).
60. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1027.
61. See id. at 1025.
62. See id. at 1028.
63. See id.
64. See supranote 15. Title IX was patterned after Title VI. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1997.
Both forbid recipients of federal funds from discriminating in the administration of their programs.
Title VI forbids racial discrimination while Title IX forbids discrimination on the basis of sex.
Aside from this difference, the two statutes areworded virtually identically. See id. UnderTitle VI,
the standard of institutional liability has always been intentional discrimination. See supranote 15.
65. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1031-32 (quoting Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. of
New York, 463 U.S. 582, 596 (1983)).
66. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
67. See Rosa, 106 F.3d at 655.
68. See Smith, 128 F.3d at 1032.
69. See id. (quoting Rosa, 106 F.3d at 656).
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certainty the conditions that attached to its acceptance of federal funds.70
This would deprive the school district a meaningful opportunity to engage
in a cost-benefit analysis regarding accepting federal funds.7 ' Since
astronomical damages could attach to the sexual abuse or molestation of
young children, the Seventh Circuit concluded that holding school districts
liable under agency principles could financially cripple public education.72
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gebser, expressed concern that an
actual notice standard will be an incentive for school districts to stick their
heads in the sand to insulate themselves from acquiring knowledge of
discrimination and thereby avoid liability.73 However, as the Fifth Circuit
noted, it would be foolish for school districts to take this approach because
they would still face the threat of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'7 The

GebserCourt also dealt with this concern by indicating that their holding
did not affect any remedies under state law that a victim of discrimination

may have against the school district or the teacher in his individual

capacity.75 In any case, this hypothetical concern should not be the impetus
to expand liability under Title IX when doing so appears unreasonable.
The Supreme Court, in Gebser, interpreted for the first time the
standard of school district liability for teacher-student sexual harassment
under Title IX 6 In doing so, the Court cleared up a myriad of confusion
among the circuit courts.'77 The Supreme Court followed the better
reasoning of the circuits that had held agency principles inapplicable to
Title IX.7' This decision gives school districts a clear indication of what the

70. See id. (quoting Guardians,463 U.S. at 596).
71. See id.
72. See id The Seventh Circuit also explained that there is no sound policy reason to hold
schooldistricts strictly liable for the sexually discriminatory practices ofits teachers. See id. at 1030
(quoting Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 1996)). The court
reasoned that strict liability attached to product manufacturers for two reasons. See id. at 1030-31.
First, product manufacturers are better able to spread the risk of large verdicts among its customers
by simply raising the prices of its products. See id. at 1030 (quoting Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399).
But a school district cannot do this, for its "products" are its students. See id. Second, product
manufacturers are in a better position than consumers to search for and discover product and design
defects. See id. at 1031 (quoting Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399). This logic, however, does not apply
to school districts. See id.
73. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See Rosa, 106 F.3d at 658. The Fifth Circuit also noted that it would be immoral for a
school district to take this approach. See id. It must be remembered that school districts are public
entities and, as such, they are subject to the pressures of public opinion from the community they
purport to serve.
75. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000.
76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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conditions are for accepting federal funds.79 It will allow schools to
continue to focus on their primary task of educating children rather than
policing the relationships between teachers and students.'0

79. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
80. See generally supra note 73.
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